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ABSTRACT 
Serverless applications are based on a microservices-oriented system design, often 
consisting of several services, each with distinct functions that are composed and orchestrated to 
deliver specific functionality.  The architecture allows firms to build and deploy software 
applications without consideration towards provisioning or maintaining the underlying 
infrastructure.  The novelty of the architecture and its inherent characteristics present new 
challenges for cybersecurity.  We discuss the security imperatives of this emerging cloud 
computing software paradigm.  We then identify some of the approaches and practices that can 
be used by organizations to mitigate security threats in the context of serverless computing. 
Keywords: Cybersecurity, Cloud Computing, Serverless, FaaS.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Serverless computing is regarded as the next stage in the evolution of cloud computing as 
more and more computing migrates to the cloud (Barga 2017). It is expected that by 2020, 67% 
of all spending on IT infrastructure and software will be on cloud-based platforms (IDC 2016).  
Organizations adopt cloud computing for managing their IT infrastructure as it promises to be 
more scalable, on demand, less complex to manage and can easily and transparently shared as a 
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service across all applications and users. Initial cloud computing models rely on virtualization, 
however virtualization still requires maintaining and provisioning virtual servers with the need to 
take into consideration underlying operating system, application server, load balancing, security 
and other aspects of the run time environment (Lynn et al. 2017).  Such an architecture, without 
substantial in-house expertise, makes it difficult for the software owner to decide how many 
virtual servers to deploy and maintain their scaling in response to traffic and computing needs 
(Fox et al. 2017).  This was brought to sharp relief, when fans of John Oliver’s HBO talk show 
brought down the FCC website with the sheer volume of traffic it generated and in what was 
initially thought to be a dDOS attack (Wallace 2018).  Serverless architectures, in contrast, are 
characterized by on-demand, event-driven, short-lived, stateless computation that scales instantly 
and automatically (Lynn et al. 2017, Albuquerque et al. 2017). This event-driven approach to 
cloud computing invokes functions that usually have a small footprint, upon the occurrence of an 
event or action, are short living, stateless and release resources allocated to them once the 
function terminates (McGrath and Brenner 2017). This micro-service architecture provides a 
flexible and scalable approach to designing applications, where developers can focus on core 
product functionality without consideration of the underlying platforms or runtime environments. 
Applications owners no longer have to worry about the underlying infrastructure as the service 
provider takes on the responsibility of maintaining and securing the data center, network, servers, 
operating systems and their configurations. 
The emergence of serverless architectures and computing presents numerous 
opportunities for software vendors and developers and offers several advantages along with some 
inherent limitations, the discussion of which is not central to this effort.  As an emerging 
paradigm, serverless computing also presents numerous challenges, of which cybersecurity is a 
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critical issue.  The domain is rapidly evolving, complex and not well understood; the attempt 
here is to place some markers to understand the landscape, issues and practices for cybersecurity 
that are driven by this new architecture. We next discuss some of the key cybersecurity 
challenges for software developers and owners. 
THE SERVERLESS COMPUTING LANDSCAPE: CYBERSECURITY IMPERATIVES  
 Serverless architectures, also known as Function as a Service (FaaS), lets organizations 
build and deploy software without maintaining physical or virtual servers. Applications built 
using serverless architecture are designed to scale elastically with workload.  These architectures 
required development of functionality that is scalable, modular and follow the principle of least 
knowledge, that can communicate through common protocols (Fazio et al. 2016). For example, 
altering media files; when a user uploads a media file, a function can be invoked to automatically 
resize the image. Or when a user sends an SMS to check their bank balance, a separate function 
could send a return SMS.  Developers can compose applications with such functions that run on 
demand, in response to events, that are short lived and scale automatically without having to 
manage any of the infrastructure.  At the same time, this presents a number of cybersecurity 
challenges that arise as a consequence of the architecture itself, as there is a lack of maturity in 
the understanding the domain and paucity of well-developed tools to mitigate the challenges 
(Ahmed and Hossain 2014).  Next, we discuss some of the preeminent challenges presented by 
the architecture. 
Complexity 
Serverless applications, typically contain multiple serverless functions, each responsible 
for a distinct task, consuming different types of inputs, composed by event triggers and glued 
together with cloud services.  These architectural characteristics, make them complex and many 
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of the security challenges are related to or arise from this inherent complexity (Singh et al. 2016, 
Puresec 2018).  
Serverless functions pull data from a broad range of event sources such as HTTP APIs, 
cloud storage, data streams, code modifications, notifications, IoT device communications etc. 
The rich set of event sources increases the potential attack surface and introduces complexities 
when attempting to protect serverless functions against event-data injections (Baldini et al. 2017, 
Narula and Jain 2014).  Traditionally, application firewalls scan input and attempt to detect 
malicious payloads at application entry points. These firewalls were not designed to scan data 
coming in as a result of an API call from the application itself. Furthermore, they need to 
perform input data inspection in cloud, which may be well understood for inbound web traffic, 
but problematic for the multitude of other sources consumed by such applications (Ali et al. 
2015, Singh et al. 2016).  One option may be to route the data for inspection out of the serverless 
environment to another cloud where it is inspected and then sent back to the application. The 
consequences of such an approach would be: (i) a significant performance cost, (ii) data from the 
function runtime environment needs to be collected and sent to the cloud or another virtual 
appliance raising further privacy and security concerns and (iii) it has to be similarly scalable, i.e. 
auto-scaling with the serverless function without degrading performance (Meng 2017).  The 
performance cost also comes with a financial cost as any security tools will add to processing 
time for every request, which in turn will be billed to the application owner.  
The total amount of information and number resources also increases in serverless 
computing (Fox et al. 2017).  This is compounded by the fact that with smaller functions, 
developers are likely to deploy things quickly, incrementally and frequently (McGrath and 
Brenner 2017). This makes it difficult to garner useful intelligence from the large amounts of 
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data and get a coherent picture of the health of an application. When instead of a few instances, 
there are hundreds if not thousands of functions, it is hard to discern if any given function is 
behaving as intended.  Every function can be a potential point of attack and it is important to 
assess each of them to evaluate if they can be compromised.  This is true for protocols as well, 
with numerous different event triggers, each with their own methods for invocation.  More 
resources also mean that there are more permissions that need to managed. The rich set of event 
sources increases the potential attack surface and introduces complexities when attempting to 
protect serverless functions against event-data injections (Aikat et al. 2017, Ahmed and Hossain 
2014). 
Serverless applications are by nature ephemeral, and may execute in globally distributed 
data centers and resources that are not controlled by the application owner (Lynn et al. 2017).  
The short-lived nature of the architecture does have some advantage with the fact that serverless 
functions are ‘online’ for a short period of time and have no memory, making them less 
susceptible to long-term attacks. However, this makes it particularly challenging for 
organizations to deploy traditional security layers such as web application firewalls, host-based 
intrusion prevention, endpoint protection etc.  In addition, there is the erosion of a well-defined 
perimeter that bounded traditional architectures, making it difficult to determine where security 
should be deployed. This ephemerality also necessitates that the security solutions too need to 
scale in tandem with the serverless application as and when they execute (Fazio et al. 2016, 
McGrath and Brenner 2017).   Thus, a number of cybersecurity challenges with serverless 
computing are rooted in the inherent complexity of the architecture and its characteristics as well 
as being strongly correlated to the other challenges associated with serverless architectures. 
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Function-Flow Vulnerabilities 
Serverless architecture can potentially contain many distinct serverless functions that are 
stitched together and orchestrated to create the overall application logic.  Some functions may 
expose public APIs, while others may be communicating with other functions and/or cloud 
services consuming a wide variety of inputs (Baldini et al. 2017, Ahmed and Hossain 2014).  
Formulating and implementing a robust authentication model to control access and provide 
protection to all relevant functions, event types and triggers, can be a complex undertaking and 
one that needs continuous review.  For example, an application may have a set of public APIs 
that are secured with proper authentication, however, at the back end the application may be 
reading data from a cloud storage service without proper authentication exposing an, 
unauthenticated rogue entry point for a hacker.  Without a robust authentication scheme, a hacker 
can potentially bypass application logic to manipulate its flow and thereby compromising 
security of the application. 
Similarly, a hacker may be able to compromise the system by mapping different 
serverless functions to learn their permissions, resources and capabilities in an attempt to 
manipulate the invocation order.  Using techniques like Return Oriented Programming chaining, 
the hacker can collect and re-order function executions, turning them into “serverless-gadgets”, 
and the re-using them to mount an attack against the system (PureSec 2018).  This would allow 
the hacker to bypass security protections such as authentication, authorization and validity 
checks.  Hackers have been able to cause serverless platforms to scale, running a vulnerable 
function repeatedly until they reached the platform’s limit for concurrent operations.  This is not 
necessarily a flaw in the cloud platform but a vulnerability created by the auto-scaling nature of 
serverless architecture and vulnerable application code.  Hackers can also use the Regular-
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Expression Denial of Service or ReDoS attack vector to send malicious requests that cause 
functions to stall, loop or ‘over-execute’ for long periods of time, until their concurrent execution 
limit is reached (Narula and Jain 2015).  This would not only deny legitimate users access to the 
application, but also increase the billing charges levied by the cloud provider, inflicting a 
financial cost to the target organization.  Therefore, security vulnerabilities can not only exist at 
the granular level of an individual function but in the overall application design, which in itself 
may be constantly unpredictable, vary with every instantiation and potentially unpredictable 
configurations. 
Tools and Methods 
Tools and protocols for testing security of serverless architectures are not well developed 
and understood in view of the relative novelty of the architectures, especially when these 
applications interact and consume a variety of services, not all of which are necessarily 
controlled by the application owner (Balding et al. 2017, Singh et al. 2016).  Currently available 
automated scanning tools used in software development are not well adapted to Serverless 
applications.  
Statistical Application Security Testing (SAST) tools are used to ensure that code 
conforms to guidelines and standards, which find errors in code without executing the code itself 
(IBM 2018).  Serverless applications that will contain functions stitched together on-the-fly with 
cloud services and event triggers are not amenable to such static testing (PureSec 2018).   In 
addition, SAST tools are known to generate a larger amount of false positive or false negatives.   
Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST) is used to find security weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities with the application executing for a variety of vulnerabilities such as SQL 
injection and cross-site scripting using fault injection techniques (PureSec 2018).  However, 
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DAST tools typically cover HTTP interfaces in web applications and particularly only those that 
follow the traditional HTML/HTTP request/response model and request format.  Serverless 
applications, as mentioned, interact with a variety of non-HTTP sources, third party services or 
back-end cloud services that are not covered by such tools.   
Interactive Application Security Testing (IAST) works by deploying an instrumentation 
agent inside the application that has the ability to apply its analysis to the entire application and 
produce more accurate results and verify a larger set of security rules (PureSec 2018). However, 
the ability to deploy such agents in cloud environments where the infrastructure is controlled by 
the vendor and the nature of serverless applications limits the ability to deploy them.  Similarly, 
Run-time application security protection (RASP) is a security technology that uses runtime 
instrumentation within the application tool running continuous security checks from within the 
application, allowing it to protect the application even if the network’s perimeter defenses have 
been breached. In the context of serverless architectures, current IAST and RASP deployment 
options either depend on deploying an instrumentation agent or by extracting data for inspection 
in the cloud or on a virtual appliance.  Neither of these approaches, are practical for serverless 
architectures.   
SECURING SERVERLESS ARCHITECTURES 
We have examined some of the security challenges posed by serverless architecture 
driven by its complexity and the relative newness of the technology.  We next collate some of the 
approaches that can be used to mitigate some of these challenges. 
Identifying and Detecting Threats 
We have seen that traditional tools for identifying and detecting threats are not amenable 
for deployment in serverless architecture because of the ephemeral nature of functions, control 
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over runtime environment, orchestration complexities and performance costs.  At the same time 
cloud providers provide a number of different tools that organizations can leverage.  
Organizations have more visibility in logs and monitoring tools that record which functions 
interact with which other functions and are resources are accessed with what frequency.  All of 
this visibility can substantially inform security. 
Many cloud providers provide (AWS 2018, Microsoft 2018) cloud security monitoring 
tools that enable identification of potential problems in cloud infrastructure and cloud 
configurations.  Their main objective is usually to ensure configurations are in line with best 
practices for security as well as any specific compliance requirements.  These tools will scan the 
application’s cloud account and provide feedback on the application’s security posture.  Ideally 
they should provide a complete inventory of serverless function in the applications and cloud 
services that are part of the application’s architecture (IBM 2018).  They can scan for over-
permissive roles and security policies that need to be strengthened.  Many of these tools are 
designed for traditional IaaS and PaaS models and as such should be evaluated for their 
adequacy for serverless architectures.  Some of these solutions analyze logs to detect issues or 
security related events.  Because of latency of information, these should be leveraged but are not 
a replacement for application layer protection. 
Similarly, cloud providers (AWS 2018, Google 2018) usually provide extremely capable 
logging facilities, but out of the box basic configurations are not necessarily suitable for the 
purposes of monitoring and auditing.  One of the principles for identifying and detecting security 
issues, is to enable traceability (Sahoo et al. 2010).  Organizations should monitor, alert and audit 
actions and changes to their code in real time. In order to achieve real-time security event 
monitoring with proper audit trail, developers need to integrate logs and metrics with the system 
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so that will it fit the needs of their organization like collecting real time logs and sending them to 
a remote security information and event management system. Organizations need robust 
analytics and retrieval capabilities to provide insight into security related activity (PureSec 
2018). Tools to continuously monitor events in the software environment are critical for 
intelligent threat detection. 
The ephemeral and stateless nature of serverless applications means that exploits are 
unlikely to be long-term and unlikely to gain a persistent foothold into the application.  Hackers 
are then likely to resort to repetitive stateless attack that are small and perhaps unnoticeable and 
then repeat the attack thousands of times till they complete the attack, such as exfilterating all of 
the data in small increments.  This creates the imperative that instead of focusing on specific 
event, security monitoring has to be more attuned to the overall pattern of an attack. The shift to 
cloud- and service-based infrastructures favors a hit-and-run style attack model that can be 
executed within a single refresh period, or automated to live and execute over multiple refreshes 
(PurSec 2018). Organizations then have a new key indicator by analyzing real-time attack 
telemetry (Khan 2016, Singh et al. 2016).  If the same system, infrastructure, or application 
requests or changes being made over and over again would indicate an attempt to compromise 
the system.  
Protecting against Threats 
Similar to identifying and detecting threats, organizations in the context of serverless 
computing should take into account the architecture while leveraging cloud providers’ tools for 
configuration management, Identity and Access Management (IAM) and monitoring to harden 
their applications against potential security threats (Singh et al. 2016). 
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Serverless architectures require extensive customization and configuration settings in the 
host environment to adapt them to specific tasks and needs (McGrath and Brenner 2017, Lynn et 
al. 2017). Reducing the number of configuration errors is not only important for the production 
environment but also security.  Configuration assessments can be performed using tools for 
common vulnerabilities and exposures, assess instances against security benchmarks, and 
automate notification of defects (AWS 2018). One of the recommended best practice designs for 
serverless architectures is to develop functions that are stateless, applications often rely on cloud 
storage infrastructure to store and persist data between executions (Fox et al. 2017, McGrath and 
Brenner 2017).  A common weakness is that developers leave incorrectly configured cloud 
storage authentication/authorization.  In order to avoid sensitive data vulnerabilities from cloud 
storage infrastructure, may cloud providers provide hardened cloud storage configurations, 
multi-factor authentication and encryption of data in transit and rest (AWS 2018). Application 
data that needs to be protected should be secured with encrypted storage and encryption keys 
maintained with a centralized encryption key management infrastructure or service. Similar to 
other capabilities, organizations should use of encryption key management services provided by 
these cloud providers for creation and maintenance of encryption keys (Microsoft 2018, Google 
2018). 
A recurrent theme in designing serverless applications is to follow the principles of least 
privilege (AWS 2018). The principle means that a serverless function should be given only those 
privileges, which are essential in order to perform its intended logic. The principle allows 
designers to enforce separation of duties for oversight and governance, making it easier to audit 
permissions on resources. Because functions follow the concepts of serverless architecture, many 
serverless applications contain dozens, hundreds or on occasion thousands of functions.  This in 
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turn means managing function permissions and roles quickly becomes a tedious task.  In order to 
manage the complexity organization may use a single permission model or security role for all 
functions, which are over-permissive and over-privileged (Narula and Jain 2015).  Even if they 
have the intention to come back to it later at production to a finer-grained model, more often than 
not they end up creating gaping vulnerabilities in the application. Most cloud providers make 
available Identity and Access Management (IAM) tools for setting custom roles for each 
serverless functions (AWS 2018, Microsoft 2018, Google 2018).  It is not pragmatic nor 
necessary for developers to build their own authentication schemes and rather use the IAM 
frameworks provided by the serverless environment.  Used properly, they can provide fine-
grained IAM around the functions and apply security policies to each of them.  This granularity 
can be tedious to set up and maintain, but can go a long way to ensure that a security issue with 
one function does not scale up and cascade to the application environment. When proper 
authentication/authorization is applied, unauthorized users cannot add new functions or modify 
existing function code (IBM 2018). Similarly, organizations should use the security health check 
facilities provided by the serverless cloud provider to continuously monitor correct permissions 
and assess them against the organization’s corporate security policy (AWS 2018).  This needs to 
be monitored as the application evolves, as what may once be well configured can suddenly 
become sub-optimal as things change (PureSec 2018). 
Serverless functions in order to perform a task, will often depend on third party software 
packages, open source libraries and third party remote web services through API calls (van Eyk 
et al. 2017).  These can inadvertently create vulnerabilities in the application. It is prudent to 
have a well-defined process to deal with vulnerabilities in third party components. To start with 
it is important to have an inventory of software packages and other dependencies and their 
Patnayakuni & Patnayakuni Serverless Security 
 
Proceedings of the 13th Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, San Francisco, December 13, 2018. 13
versions (Baldini et al. 2017).  With serverless apps being comprised of hundreds of functions, it 
is important to have a complete picture in order to understand the potential risk and as the 
application propagates, this can be challenging to maintain.  It is best to consume third party 
packages from trustworthy resources and making sure that packages have not been compromised 
(PureSec 2018).  
Recovering and Responding from Security Events 
As was pointed out in identification and detection of security threats, security operations 
rely on the collection of logs and the use of search tools to discover potential events of interest 
such as unauthorized activity or change.  A best practice for building mature security processes is 
to deeply integrate the flow of security events and findings into a notification and workflow 
system such as bug/issue system, ticketing system or other security information and event 
management (SIEM) systems (AWS 2018, IBM 2018).  
Similarly, defining data backup, replication, and recover approach, organizations can 
protect against deletion and destruction of data (AWS 2018, PureSec 2018).  A well-defined and 
validated process for data backup and replication can help the organization safeguard its data in 
the case of a disaster.  Proper secured and protected primary and secondary data sources ensure 
continued business operations. Just as with any other architectures, some of the practices do not 
change in the context of serverless computing.  It is important that organizations have an incident 
management process that aligns with architecture and needs of the organizations.  They should 
run incident response simulations and use tools with automation to increase the speed for 
detection, investigation and recovery. 
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CONCLUSION 
Different vendors have come up with best practices and principles for developing, 
deploying and monitoring serverless applications (AWS 2018, Microsoft 2018, Google 2018, 
IBM 2018).  Distilling them leads to some broad characteristics for solutions to secure serverless 
architecture should be (i) inherently serverless, (ii) should scale with the application, (iii) without 
adversely affect performance in a manner that would be evident to users or other consumers of 
the services and as a corollary have very light footprints, (iii) portable across cloud platforms i.e. 
should be platform and environment agnostic and (iv) evolve with the evolution of the serverless 
paradigm (Baldini et al. 2017, PureSec 2018, Singh et al. 2016).  Rather than just focusing on 
protection of a single layer, development and operations need to work in concert to map a 
defense enmeshed in the design at all layers along with other security controls.  These layers in 
addition to the application would include the edge network, subnet, load balancer, every 
instance, operating system etc. As organizations investigate serverless architectures, they need to 
be cognizant of its appropriateness for the solution domain (Fox et al. 2017), understand the 
security imperatives of the architecture and incorporate security into their operations by 
developing an appropriate portfolio of design principles, leveraging cloud platform capabilities 
and post production practices. 
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